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professionals’ “duty to protect” third-parties has been a topic of vigorous 
debate. The ensuing forty-three years witnessed considerable shifts in 
the statutory and legal landscape in the United States, including several 
significant	changes	 in	California	state	 law	over	the	past	decade	alone.	
In this historical review, I trace the evolution of the Tarasoff duty with 
a	specific	 focus	on	the	state	 in	which	that	duty	originated,	California,	
with the intention of elucidating the major policy, ethical, and practical 
questions that have followed in the wake of the Tarasoff decision.
Key Words:  Tarasoff, duty to protect, duty to warn
 Since the era of deinstitutionalization in the 1960s, imminent 
danger to self (i.e., suicide) or others (i.e., homicide) has emerged 
as one of the standard criteria for mandatory psychiatric inter-
vention in the United States (Ward, 2014). Whereas the duties of 
mental health professionals in California to suicidal clients have 
remained substantively unchanged since the 1967 passage of the 
Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, which mandated prompt risk assess-
ment and, if necessary, involuntary commitment, the question of 
the duties of mental health professionals to potential victims of 
violence other than their clients has been the source of consider-
able back-and-forth in state courts and legislatures. In fact, prior to 
the mid-twentieth century, it was not at all clear that clinicians in 
California had any (legal) obligation to individuals other than their 
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clients. For reference, the first mandatory child abuse reporting 
law in California, which applied only to physicians, was enacted 
in 1963 (Rady Children’s Hospital San Diego, 2012). 
 Due in part to an ever shifting statutory and legal landscape, 
as well as considerable inter-state variability, the duties of clini-
cians to potential victims continue to be a source of considerable 
confusion and an ethically contested subject. With these facts in 
mind, I seek to trace the historical evolution of the so-called “duty 
to protect” with a specific focus on the state in which that duty 
originated, California, and to elucidate the relevant policy, ethi-
cal, and practical questions that attend this duty.
 In 1969, Prosenjit Poddar, a graduate student at the University 
of California, Berkeley, confided to his therapist that he intended 
to kill a woman he had previously dated, Tatiana Tarasoff. Pod-
dar’s psychologist, Dr. Lawrence Moore, warned campus police 
that Poddar was experiencing an acute psychotic episode and 
recommended that Poddar be involuntarily committed on the 
grounds of being a danger to others. Poddar was briefly detained 
by campus police, but was released shortly thereafter and sub-
sequently desisted from treatment. Several months later, on Oc-
tober 27, 1969, Poddar carried out his plan, stabbing and killing 
Tatiana Tarasoff (for a more detailed discussion of the circum-
stances surrounding Tarasoff	v.	Regents, refer to Buckner & Fires-
tone, 2000).
 Following her death, Tarasoff’s parents sued Poddar’s thera-
pists, campus police, and the Regents of the University of Cali-
fornia for, among other claims made by the plaintiffs, failing to 
warn their daughter that she was in danger. In 1974, in a deci-
sion now commonly referred to as Tarasoff	I	(Tarasoff v. Regents 
of the University of California, 1974), the California Supreme 
Court held that psychotherapists had a duty of care not only to 
their clients, but also to individuals who might be harmed by 
their clients. Specifically, Tarasoff	 I	held that therapists were obli-
gated to warn potential victims of dangers posed to them by the 
therapists’ psychotherapy clients. Failing to warn such victims 
would render therapists liable to civil judgment.
 Judge Mathew Tobriner, writing for the majority in Tara-
soff	I, concluded that “public policy favoring protection of the 
confidential character of patient-psychotherapist relationships 
must yield in instances in which disclosure is essential to avert 
danger to others; the protective privilege ends where the public 
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peril begins” (Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 
1974, section 2, paragraph 17). This statement encapsulates the 
central values tension at the heart of Tarasoff: at what point does 
a therapist’s professional and ethical obligation to maintain a cli-
ent’s confidentiality come into conflict with a compelling inter-
est to promote public safety, and, more to the point, how ought 
such conflicts be resolved? 
 Survey data collected by Givelber, Bowers, and Blitch (1984) 
highlight this conflict: out of the 2785 mental health professionals 
that they surveyed nearly ten years after Tarasoff	I, 45% of cli-
nicians who had breached confidentiality to communicate with 
a potential victim felt that they had violated their own clinical 
judgment by breaching confidentiality. This finding resonates 
with the widely held belief that confidentiality is essential to 
the practice of therapy (e.g., American Psychiatric Association, 
2013). Nevertheless, respondents overwhelmingly endorsed a re-
sponsibility to potential victims as a matter of professional and 
personal ethics. This speaks to the deep bind in which clinicians 
sometimes find themselves when working with dangerous cli-
ents. In Tarasoff	I, however, the court erred firmly on the side of 
public safety by clearly establishing a “duty to warn.”
 Prior to Tarasoff	I, no court anywhere in the nation had recog-
nized such a legal duty to warn the potential victims of a patient 
(Cohn, 1983). In the wake of Tarasoff	I, individual practitioners 
and professional organizations raised numerous objections to 
the court’s ruling, arguing that the duty to warn would jeop-
ardize the practice of psychotherapy by eroding the essential 
precept of confidentiality and contending that therapists could 
not reliably assess the likelihood of future violent acts by their 
patients (Quinn, 1984). Based on these and other objections, in-
cluding concerns about civil liability, the American Psychiatric 
Association, the Northern California Psychiatric Society, and 
other professional organizations filed an amicus curiae brief to 
challenge the court’s 1974 decision. In response, the California 
Supreme Court took the unusual step of agreeing to rehear the 
case, resulting in a second decision, known as Tarasoff	II	(Tara-
soff v. University of California Regents, 1976), being handed 
down in 1976.
 In keeping with the spirit of Tarasoff	I, the 1976 decision im-
posed upon psychotherapists in California a legal duty to protect 
third parties from harmful acts perpetrated by their patients, 
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even if doing so required the therapist to breach the patient’s 
confidentiality. Indeed, the court held that it was precisely be-
cause of the “special relationship” between therapists and cli-
ents that the therapists have “a duty to control the conduct” of 
their clients in cases in which third parties may be “foreseeably 
endangered” by their client’s conduct (Tarasoff v. Regents of the 
University of California, 1976, section 2, para. 5).
 However, contrary to Tarasoff	I, the court ruled that discharg-
ing this duty to protect third parties did not necessarily require 
warning potential victims:
When a therapist determines, or pursuant to the standards 
of his profession should determine, that his patient presents 
a serious danger of violence to another, he incurs an obli-
gation to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim 
against such danger. The discharge of this duty may require 
the therapist to take one or more of various steps, depending 
upon the nature of the case. Thus it may call for him to warn 
the intended victim or others likely to apprise the victim of the 
danger, to notify the police, or to take whatever other steps 
are reasonably necessary under the circumstances. (empha-
sis added; Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 
1976, para. 4).
Having moved from a highly specific ‘duty to warn’ to a more 
general ‘duty to protect,’ the decision in Tarasoff	II	allowed for 
increased flexibility on the part of the clinician. At the same 
time, the 1976 decision also increased the ambiguity with which 
clinicians now had to contend by providing only vague guide-
lines as to how clinicians were expected to discharge the newly 
imposed ‘duty to protect’ (Mills, Sullivan, & Eth, 1987). 
 Moreover, a provision in the 1976 decision specifically found 
that therapists could be held personally liable if they “should 
have” known that a patient was dangerous prior to that patient 
committing a violent act. Yet the court left unspecified the extent 
or content of the knowledge that the therapist would have needed 
to possess to subsequently be held liable or the steps that thera-
pists would need to have taken to protect themselves from liabil-
ity (section 2, para. 14). This ambiguity resulted in civil actions in 
which therapists were held liable for situations in which it would 
have been nearly impossible for the therapist to anticipate the 
specific injury or to have protected the injured third parties, such 
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as substance-related car accidents that occurred months after the 
driver was seen by a therapist (Pettis & Gutheil, 1993).
 At the same time, the initial concerns about breach of confi-
dentiality and the ramifications of such breaches for the practice 
of psychotherapy persisted in the wake of the 1976 decision. In a 
dissenting opinion in Tarasoff	II,	Judge William Clark highlight-
ed these concerns when he wrote that:
Given the importance of confidentiality to the practice of 
psychiatry, it becomes clear the duty to warn imposed 
by the majority will cripple the use and effectiveness of 
psychiatry. Many people, potentially violent—yet sus-
ceptible to treatment—will be deterred from seeking it; 
those seeking it will be inhibited from making revela-
tions necessary to effective treatment; and forcing the 
psychiatrist to violate the patient’s trust will destroy the 
interpersonal relationship by which treatment is effected. 
(Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 1976, 
J. Clark dissent, paragraph 28)
Clark, channeling the concerns of many practitioners, was anx-
ious that by codifying an exception to patient-client confiden-
tiality, the court’s decision would have the unintended conse-
quence of dissuading potentially dangerous individuals from 
availing themselves of psychotherapy or from disclosing homi-
cidal thoughts and plans. 
 Clark’s sentiments were widely echoed by prominent mental 
health professionals, including by the presidents of the Amer-
ican Psychiatric Association (Stone, 1976) and the American 
Psychological Association (Siegel, 1979). Max Siegel, then the 
president of the American Psychological Association, wrote of 
Tarasoff, “This was a day in court for the law and not for the men-
tal health professions. If the psychologist had accepted the view 
of absolute, inviolate confidentiality, he might have been able to 
have kept Poddar in treatment, saved the life of Tatiana Tarasoff, 
and avoided what was to become the Tarasoff decision” (Siegel, 
1979, p. 253). Siegel’s statement speaks not only to the abiding 
respect for the precept of confidentiality, but also to one of the 
tremendous difficulties in adjudicating Tarasoff cases: namely, 
that it is invariably possible to argue and nearly impossible to 
refute the counterfactual in which some set of actions taken or 
30 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
not taken by a clinician (as opposed to the actions they actually 
took) might have saved a victim’s life.
 It should also be noted that although the court’s decisions in 
Tarasoff	I	and II applied only to California, the effects of those 
decisions reverberated nationally. As of 2012, a duty to warn or 
protect had been codified by legislative statute in twenty-three 
states and was present in the common law supported by judicial 
precedent in an additional ten states (Johnson, Persad, & Sisti, 
2014). Although a review of statutes and common law precedents 
in states other than California is beyond the scope of this article, 
it is certainly interesting to reflect on the extent of state-by-state 
variability, particularly as it relates to the challenge of adequate-
ly training and educating clinicians (refer to Johnson et al., 2014 
for a review of inter-state variability). 
 This challenge is undoubtedly magnified by the ever-chang-
ing and often conflicting legal landscape, even within a given 
state. A mere four years after Tarasoff	II, in a case involving the 
decision to parole a juvenile offender who had threatened to kill 
a neighborhood child upon his release, the California Supreme 
Court held that Alameda County “had no affirmative duty to 
warn Plaintiffs, the police, the mother of the juvenile offender, 
or other local parents” (a decision which Judge Tobriner dis-
sented) (Thompson v. County of Alameda, 1980). Meanwhile, in 
1983, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, whose appellate jurisdic-
tion includes California, went precisely the other direction and 
broadened the foreseeability criteria laid out in Tarasoff	in Jablon-
ski	by	Pahls	v.	United	States	(1983) (refer to Walcott, Cerundolo, & 
Beck, 2001 for a discussion of Jablonski).
 In 1986, in response to concerns about ambiguity and liabil-
ity that followed in the wake of the 1976 Tarasoff	II	decision, the 
California state legislature passed a statute that limited ther-
apists’ duty to protect and attendant liability to situations in 
which the patient communicated to the therapist an imminent 
threat to an identifiable victim, thereby clarifying that therapists 
could not be held liable for any and all future harmful actions 
committed by their current or former clients. Simultaneously, the 
1986 statute shielded therapists from any potential civil action 
that might arise due to breach of confidentiality, as long as they 
did so within the narrow confines of discharging their duty to 
protect as defined by the statute. 
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 Ironically, however, the 1986 statute introduced fresh am-
biguity by referring to a “duty to warn and protect” (Cal. Civ. 
Code § 43.92, 1986), rendering unclear whether the legislature in-
tended to reintroduce a specific duty to warn akin to that which 
had been outlined in Tarasoff	I. Two years prior to the passage 
of the 1986 statute, Givelber and colleagues (1984) had found 
that over 90% of California clinicians believed that they were 
legally obligated to warn potential victims as a result of Tarasoff, 
so it is not difficult to imagine that the inclusion of the phrase 
“duty to warn” in the 1986 statute confirmed and reinforced this 
mistaken belief. That a misunderstanding of the court’s ruling 
in Tarasoff	II	was so pervasive in California at the time speaks to 
the need for clear communication of policy to stakeholders, es-
pecially in a case such as Tarasoff, in which the waters had been 
muddied by the court’s decision to rehear the case and amend 
their decision a mere two years after their initial, controversial 
(and therefore widely circulated) ruling.
 Fast forward seventeen years, and the ambiguity inherent in 
the 1986 statute was explicitly interpreted and codified as a duty 
to warn in the 2003 issuance of the simplified civil jury instruc-
tions (Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instructions, No. 
503A and 503B, 2014), meaning that juries were being explicit-
ly instructed to apply a ‘duty to warn’ criterion in determining 
whether a clinician could be held liable in a Tarasoff cause of 
action (Weinstock, Vari, Leong, & Silva, 2006). At around the 
same time in 2004, a pair of appellate court decisions, Ewing v. 
Northridge	Hospital	Medical	Center	 and Ewing v. Goldstein, held 
that a specific duty to warn existed based on the ambiguous 
wording of the 1986 statute. In the Ewing decisions, the court held 
that therapists could be held liable if a serious threat to an iden-
tifiable victim was communicated to the therapist by the client 
or by one of the client’s immediate family members and the ther-
apist failed to warn the victim regardless of other protective actions 
taken by the therapist, such as alerting the police. The combined 
effect of these appellate decisions and the revised jury instruc-
tions was that, for a period of several years in California more 
than twenty-five years after Tarasoff	II, failure to meet the duty to 
warn was presumptive proof of negligence.
 In 2007, in response to the decisions in Ewing and Ewing, the 
state legislature was prompted to revisit the 1986 immunity stat-
ute. Although the legislature did insert language clarifying that 
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warning a potential victim was merely one of a set of actions by 
which the duty to protect could be satisfied, they elected to retain 
the phrase “duty to warn and protect” (Cal. Civ. Code § 43.92, 
2007). In light of past confusions, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
this attempt at clarification proved insufficient: in 2013, the state 
legislature updated the statute yet again, this time removing the 
phrase “duty to warn” altogether (Cal. Civ. Code § 43.92, 2013). 
As part of the 2013 revision, and in order to forestall additional 
misinterpretation, the legislature felt moved to explicitly lay out 
their intent: “It is the intent of the Legislature that the amend-
ments made by the act adding this subdivision only change the 
name of the duty referenced in this section from a duty to warn 
and protect to a duty to protect” (Cal. Civ. Code § 43.92(d), 2013). 
 Alongside these legislative actions, the California Judicial 
Council revised the civil jury instructions in 2007 and again in 
2014 to clarify that therapists were not necessarily obligated to 
warn potential victims to discharge their duty to protect. The cu-
mulative effect of these changes to the immunity statute and the 
jury instructions is that if a therapist chooses not to warn, but in-
stead pursues an alternative course of action, their actions must 
be affirmatively proven to have been negligent for the therapist to 
be held personally liable. Still, there remains considerable room 
for interpretation by judges, juries, and clinicians in the current 
statute. As one example, what precisely constitutes a “serious 
threat” of physical violence as opposed to an unserious threat? 
 It is within this shifting and ambiguous landscape that the 
legacy of Tarasoff	v.	Regents	of	the	University	of	California	continues 
to be contested to this day. Alan Stone, the former president of 
the American Psychiatric Association who had lambasted Tara-
soff	II	in 1976, conceded in 1984 that the duty to warn was “not 
as unmitigated a disaster for the enterprise of psychotherapy as 
it once seemed to critics like myself” (Stone, 1984, p. 181). Yet as 
recently as 2014, Donald Bersoff, himself a former president of the 
American Psychological Association, described Tarasoff	as “per-
haps the most notorious case in mental health law” (Bersoff, 2014, 
p. 461). In insisting that Tarasoff	was “bad law, bad social science, 
and bad social policy,” Bersoff emphasized, as previous critics 
had, that the legal obligations imposed by Tarasoff,	particularly 
obligations to warn third parties, might have the consequence 
of reducing the likelihood that patients would disclose violent 
urges and increasing the likelihood of desistance from therapy, 
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thereby “making it impossible to work through the threat of vio-
lence” (Bersoff, 2014, p. 461). 
 Douglas Mossman (2009) has offered a parallel critique of 
the Tarasoff	doctrine as “a legal mechanism whereby society as-
signs mental health professionals the duty of reducing the risk of 
violence, with the threat of tort liability representing the profes-
sionals’ incentive to accede to the duty” and has argued that vio-
lence prevention through effective psychotherapy, as opposed to 
violence prediction, should be the focus of mental health profes-
sionals (p. 112). Whereas Givelber and colleagues (1984) found 
that clinicians were startlingly confident in their own ability 
to predict violence, there is ample empirical evidence that cli-
nicians’ judgment in this domain is suspect (Large & Nielssen, 
2017; Mossman, 2009). One aspect of Mossman’s (2009) critique 
of Tarasoff	that is particularly striking, yet directly in line with 
the court’s reasoning in Tarasoff	 that therapists have a ‘duty to 
control,’ is that the duty to protect positions mental health pro-
fessionals squarely as agents for social control, which may come 
into conflict with social justice values (see also Gurevitz, 1977).
 What about the functional consequences of Tarasoff? To date, 
no empirical analyses have specifically addressed whether 
acutely homicidal clients who receive and remain engaged in 
therapy are, in fact, less likely to act on their homicidal inten-
tions than similar clients who desist from therapy. It does ap-
pear to be the case, however, that psychosocial interventions 
for violence and aggression can be effective, which supports 
the broader notion that reducing barriers to adequate treatment 
receipt and keeping violent clients engaged in therapy are im-
portant therapeutic goals (McGuire, 2008; O’Brien & Daffern, 
2015; Sher & Rice, 2015). This would seem, in turn, to substan-
tiate Bersoff’s concerns about violent clients avoiding or desist-
ing from therapy because of Tarasoff-related concerns. Unfortu-
nately, there is minimal empirical evidence to assess whether 
Tarasoff has actually affected clients’ engagement in therapy in 
this way.   
 In a recent analysis, Edwards (2010) suggested that duty to 
warn laws may actually increase the rate of homicides, which 
Edwards attributes to mental health professionals being more 
reluctant to provide services to potentially violent clients as a re-
sult of duty to warn obligations and to clients being less willing 
to disclose after becoming aware of the limits to confidentiality. 
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This contention is not in line with Givelber and colleagues’ 
(1984) finding that clinicians who viewed themselves as bound 
by the court’s holding in Tarasoff	did not report being less will-
ing to treat dangerous patients or being more willing to termi-
nate treatment. Moreover, clinicians who viewed themselves 
as legally bound by Tarasoff	were considerably more likely to 
report having taken concrete steps, such as warning potential 
victims and notifying the police, when they deemed their clients 
to be at serious risk of harming another person than clinicians 
who viewed themselves as ethically, but not legally, obligated to 
protect potential victims, suggesting that Tarasoff	was having its 
intended effect of binding clinicians to a duty to protect (Givel-
ber et al., 1984).
 Although the moral-ethical question of whether an increased 
willingness to warn is desirable is ultimately beyond the scope 
of this review, it is interesting to note that, in at least some cases, 
Tarasoff	warnings may unintentionally be leading directly to the 
criminal prosecution of individuals with mental illness in Cali-
fornia. Issuing violent threats is a criminal offense in California, 
and police may opt to pursue criminal charges if such threats 
are brought to their attention (Weiner, 2003). Violence risk as-
sessments conducted by mental health professionals have also 
come to play an increasingly prominent role in multiple aspects 
of the workings of the criminal justice system since the Tara-
soff	decisions were handed down (Buchanan et al., 2012) (for more 
on the ethics of violence risk assessment as it relates to Tarasoff, 
refer to Mossman, 2006). Such cases highlight the delicate and 
occasionally perilous balance that clinicians are forced to strike 
between confidentiality and their obligations to their clients on 
the one hand and their duty to protect on the other, as well as 
the intersection between mental health professionals and law 
enforcement officers in applying Tarasoff. 
 In a similar vein, a survey of police desk sergeants conduct-
ed by Huber and colleagues (2000) in Michigan and South Car-
olina, both of which have duty to warn statutes, found that few-
er than a quarter of the police stations in question had specific 
policies related to Tarasoff	warnings and hardly any of the desk 
sergeants personally had knowledge about the Tarasoff	case, al-
though nearly half reported that their station had received at 
least one such warning from a mental health professional. Huber 
and colleagues also observed considerable variability in desk 
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sergeants’ responses to hypothetical questions (e.g., if a warning 
was received, would the potential victim be notified?), suggest-
ing that not only clinicians, but also law enforcement agencies 
ought to be formulating responses to and raising awareness 
about Tarasoff	(Huber et al., 2000).
 Forty-plus years after Tarasoff	I, if there is one thing on which 
Tarasoff’s proponents and critics agree, it is on the far-ranging im-
pact that Tarasoff	has had on mental health policy. To wit, Douglas 
Mossman (2006) declared that “no court ruling has had a broader 
or more enduring impact on day-to-day mental health practice… .
Thirty years after its promulgation, Tarasoff	remains, to mental 
health professionals, the most influential ruling in mental dis-
ability law” (pp. 524-526). As evidence of its far-reaching effects 
on mental health policy, one need only consider the fact that Tara-
soff	not only motivated corresponding legal action and legislation 
in states across the country, but also shaped thinking about other 
contexts in which health professionals may have a duty to protect 
third parties, such as the controversy surrounding whether phy-
sicians ought to warn the partners of HIV positive patients (for 
a detailed discussion, refer to Burke, 2015). Simultaneously, Tara-
soff	prompted numerous and vigorous discussions of the ethical 
obligations of mental health professionals and reflections on the 
importance of confidentiality as a central tenet of clinical work. 
 With respect to the actual practice and provision of mental 
healthcare in the state of California, Tarasoff, as most recently cod-
ified by California Civil Code § 43.92 (2013), has established that 
mental health professionals do have an affirmative obligation 
to take reasonable steps to protect third parties from a patient’s 
violence behavior, at least in cases in which the patient “has 
communicated to the psychotherapist a serious threat of physi-
cal violence against a reasonably identifiable victim or victims” 
(Cal Civ Code § 43.92(a), 2013). Although this obligation need not 
necessarily entail warning the intended victim, therapists who 
fail to discharge their duty to protect may be held personally 
liable. On the other hand, if, in discharging their duty to protect, 
the therapist does elect to communicate the threat to the victim 
or to a law enforcement agency, they are shielded from liability 
that might otherwise result from the breach of confidentiality. 
 This is the status of the Tarasoff	duty in California today; 
yet, given the number of alterations, both small and large, that 
have been made to the duty to protect in California over the last 
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forty-three years by the courts and the state legislature, it seems 
almost certain that mental health policy in this arena will con-
tinue to evolve over time, necessitating ongoing engagement by 
and education for mental health professionals practicing in the 
state of California, as well as consumers and law enforcement 
agencies.
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